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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

the lower court. In Stevens v. MVAIC,46 plaintiff sought leave to
transfer the action from the supreme court to the New York City
Civil Court. The action had arisen out of an alleged hit-and-run
accident, and since it was brought directly against MVAIC it
was governed by Section 618(a) of the Insurance Law. This section provides that the supreme court has the power to allow an
action to be brought directly against MVAIC "in such court."
Due to the exactness of this language, the court held that only the
supreme court had jurisdiction over such a suit, and therefore
removal to the civil court must be denied. Since the civil court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the action could not properly
have been commenced there, and hence Section 325 of the CPLR
precluded any such removal.
PARTIES GENERALLY
Section 1001 - Necessary Joinder of Parties
Section 1001 of the CPLR, providing for joinder of necessary
parties, essentially maintains prior practice but provides for greater
flexibility in the resolution of nonjoinder problems. Subdivision
(b) of the statute permits the court, under certain enumerated
situations, discretion to excuse the nonjoinder of a person who
ought to be a party, but over whom jurisdiction cannot be obtained.47 The determination of whether or not to permit the
action to continue without joinder of such a person will not depend
on his being classified as "conditionally necessary" or "indispensable," because such language has been eliminated.
The section achieves flexibility by suggesting criteria for the
court in its determination of whether or not to dismiss the action
for nonjoinder. Essentially, these criteria permit the court to
weigh the interests of the litigants, the absentee and the public. 48
Two cases have recently interpreted this statute. In one, 49 the
court held that an action to foreclose a second mortgage would be
allowed to continue without the joinder of the first mortgagee since
the rights of all the parties presently before the court could be
adiudicated without his being joined. The court indicated that
prior case law determining which parties were "necessary" would
still be important under the CPLR.50
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In the second case, 51 the court denied a motion to dismiss a
complaint for failure to join a foreign sovereign who was immune
from suit in this jurisdiction. The court decided that the nonjoinder of the party could be excused in the interests of justice
under section 1001. The court indicated that the possibility that
the State of Basellande might have a direct cause of action against
defendant for breach of warranty with respect to material supplied
to plaintiff for installation in a hospital in Switzerland pursuant
to a contract between plaintiff and Basellande was too remote to
make it a necessary. party to the action.
Thus, although precedent will still be influential in the area,
section 1001 appears to afford greater discretion in permitting an
action to continue despite the fact that a "necessary" party has
not been joined.
Section 1003 -

Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties

Section 1003 of the CPLR provides that where there has
been a nonjoinder or misjoinder of proper parties, the court, either
on its own initiative or on the motion of -any party, may add or52
drop a party "upon such terms as are just." In a recent case
the defendant, an insurance company, issued a fire policy payable
to the "Estate of Frank Pallante."
The insured property was
destroyed, and plaintiff, as devisee of the property under the
unprobated will of Frank Pallante, sought a declaratory judgment
determining the policy's coverage. Plaintiff joined as defendants
her brother, the. executor of the unprobated will, and her sister,
who had filed obiections to the will. Defendant insurance company moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue. The court indicated that even though
plaintiff might lack the capacity to maintain the action, it would
not presently dismiss the complaint. A dismissal would apparently
have barred any remedy because the one year limitation in the
policy had already run.
The court, under the authority of section 1003, made the
executor, who had been named a narty defendant, a party plaintiff,
with leave to serve a supplemental complaint.5 3 While under Section 192 of the CPA it had been held that an action would not
be dismissed merely because one of the plaintiffs was not entitled
to the relief sought,54 there was little precedent as to whether
51 Johns-Manville Int'l Corp. v. Insul-Fil Co., 41 Misc. 2d 233, 245
N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
52Cariello v. Northern Ins. Co., 41 Misc. 2d 456, 244 N.Y.S.2d 713
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54 1d. at 461-62, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
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